This article examines the enforcement of waste law in Northern Ireland. It considers how a legacy of historical failures to enforce legislation in conjunction with inadequate arrangements for the delivery of environmental regulation continues to frustrate environmental protection efforts in this jurisdiction. The article demonstrates that challenges associated with delivering waste regulation faced by other UK environmental regulators are more acute in Northern Ireland due to a range of distinctive circumstances and the response of the devolved government in addressing these issues has so far achieved only limited success. The article concludes that a significant shift in enforcement culture and practice in Northern Ireland is necessary in order to ensure enforcement action against waste criminals is effective, but that ultimately fundamental structural changes to the architecture of environmental regulation are required.
Introduction
The enforcement of waste law is a notoriously challenging branch of environmental regulation. On the one hand, the task of regulating the legitimate waste industry is expensive, labour intensive and demanding in terms of its administration. It involves not only the dedication of significant resources for monitoring and enforcement efforts, but also the successful navigation of a bewildering (and constantly evolving) array of rules and regulations by both the regulator and the regulated community.
1 On the other hand, the costs associated with responsible waste management have created significant financial incentives for unscrupulous operators to dispose of waste illegally. 2 The process of dealing with this particular brand of environmental non-compliance has thus brought environment agencies across the UK and throughout Europe face to face with organised criminal networks operating increasingly sophisticated illegal disposal operations. 3 As a result, regulators have been forced environment ministers 9 that those responsible would be held accountable. 10 However, the protracted nature of the offending that occurred at this particular site and the blatant disregard for the rule of environmental law thus displayed raises important questions as to how and why its perpetrators were able to undertake illegal activities on such an extensive scale with apparent impunity for so long, and what sanctioning response can create an effective deterrent against future commission of this type of environmental crime. These questions are not only relevant in the Northern Irish context where the quality of environmental regulation has been the subject of sustained and repeated criticism for decades, but also resonate across the UK where the enforcement efforts of environmental regulators in relation to waste have also come under significant scrutiny. 11 For Northern Ireland see Turner (n 6) and Turner and Brennan (n 6), for other parts of the UK see for example: DEFRA,
Government response to consultation on enhanced enforcement powers and other measures to tackle waste crime and
entrenched poor performance in the waste management industry (October 2015) This article will firstly consider the creation of a scenario in Northern Ireland where historical regulatory failures generated a weakened deterrent to compliance with waste legislation. Particular attention will be paid to the findings of a series of highly critical scrutiny reports published over the last 25 years that have expressed almost constant dissatisfaction with the delivery of waste regulation in Northern but also highlight a number of distinctive features of the regional context that have aggravated the difficulties associated with enforcing waste law in this jurisdiction. Secondly, the article will examine attempts made by the NIEA to tailor enforcement strategies to respond to the unique problems facing regulators in the devolved context. It will evaluate a programme of reform that began in 2008, and the impact of an accompanying shift in enforcement strategy on the delivery of waste regulation in practice. A key issue that will be explored is the lack of an overarching strategy relating to waste enforcement and the negative impact of fractured structural arrangements for delivering waste regulation. Finally, the article will consider the implications of recent reports that have linked the large-scale illegal dumping discovered in 2013 to wider regulatory problems. It is argued that these discoveries not only provide compelling evidence of graphic failures in waste
regulation, but also demonstrate the urgent need for more far-reaching reforms in how the environment is protected in this jurisdiction. In the face of renewed public and political concern about the quality of environmental regulation delivered in Northern Ireland, this article will ultimately consider the options now available to the NIEA and the devolved government in terms of responding to complaints of systemic failure in enforcing the rule of environmental law.
2. The Creation of a Weakened Deterrent
In Northern Ireland environmental regulation has proven to be a problematic endeavour for some decades, occurring within a complex and shifting political arena where until relatively recently security concerns and attempts to negotiate and maintain a lasting peace settlement have eclipsed all other government priorities. Not only has the legislative framework designed to protect the environment been the subject of delayed modernisation, 12 but the location of the environmental regulator within central government has also raised well-documented questions about accountability, transparency and the risk of political interference in environmental decision-making. 13 In addition, a series of highly critical scrutiny reports published in the 1990s
and early 2000s provided evidence of lax, fragmented, inconsistent and non-transparent regulation characterised by a particularly problematic approach to enforcing the rule of environmental law. advantage over legitimate business, thus distorting the waste market and damaging the environment at the same time. 50 Although the focus of the 2007 CJI report was on DOE criminal justice policy and practice, the perception of problematic handling of environmental prosecutions by Northern Ireland's judiciary was also highlighted, alongside a number of other issues associated with the operation of the wider criminal justice system such as 'inexperienced prosecutors, court adjournments, levels of fines etc'. 51 The CJI considered that these wider issues had impeded enforcement efforts, and that there was a need for 'specialist legal jurisdiction' for environmental crime in order to 'strike a balance between the real costs of crime and the outcomes (in terms of sentences and the recovery of costs)'. Thirdly, structural deficiencies have added to the difficulties faced by enforcement staff operating within the DOE. There are two aspects to this issue, firstly the problems associated with the location of the regulatory body as an executive agency operating within the central government and secondly the fragmented arrangements for the actual delivery of waste regulation in practice. In relation to the overarching structural problems, the ramifications of a 'captured' regulator are particularly relevant in the context of waste -most notably in terms of the risk of political interference with enforcement activity. On the one hand this could involve political interference in particular cases that may influence decisions surrounding the commencement or pursuit of enforcement action -an issue explicitly raised by the CJI. 61 On the other hand, the fact that Northern Ireland's environmental regulator is located within central government and not under the auspices of an independent environmental protection agency (an arrangement unique within the UK) means that regulatory strategies are arguably at risk of being influenced by the political agenda of the party that is responsible for host department at any given time. 62 Finally, and as an extension of the previous factors, the very distinctive context within which regulators are operating has itself resulted in particularly fragmented arrangements for dealing with waste and the creation of a so-called 'silo' approach to enforcement. 63 In other words, there are essentially multiple bodies with responsibility for discrete categories of waste regulation operating within the regulator as a whole, an arrangement complicated further by the fact that some regulatory functions relating to waste continue to rest with district councils. This has created a scenario where certain types of waste crime can 'slip through the cracks' in regulatory effort. These cracks relate not only to the boundaries in regulatory effort between the district councils and the NIEA but also within NIEA itself, an issue that became particularly evident in the wake of the Mobuoy scandal.
Furthermore, the resource pressure placed on all government bodies as a result of the economic downturn led to a growing sense that different enforcement units within the agency were struggling with their workload and as a consequence were drawing increasingly constricted lines around what fell within their remit. This had the effect of creating a 'blinkered', compartmentalised approach to enforcement that had significant implications in cases where offences occurred across multiple statutory regimes.
Efforts to Reform Enforcement Practice
The failure of Northern Ireland's environmental agency to respond effectively to either its clearly challenging regulatory context or to the criticism levelled at its enforcement performance by numerous public scrutiny bodies was a key impetus behind NGO demands for a new independent environmental protection agency in the mid-2000s. 64 The findings of a fundamentally shaped the NIEA's response to waste offending in the years subsequent to 2008 but has also had wider implications for the delivery of environmental regulation by the NIEA as a whole -manifested in two significant shifts in enforcement practice.
Firstly, there was a move towards focusing resources on the most severe breaches of waste law, an approach that was designed to mirror that of other agencies who handle serious crime, such as HMRC. acknowledging that prosecution may have been the best course of action on several occasions during this period.
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The second shift in the enforcement behaviour of the NIEA was a move towards using more novel sanctioning tools in response to waste crime. In addition to administrative and criminal sanctions set out in waste legislation, NIEA also has the power to pursue assets recovery proceedings such as criminal confiscation orders or referral to the National Crime reality resource constraints and internal resistance to any major structural changes within the wider agency have resulted in the ECU dealing almost exclusively with very serious waste crime. As a consequence, instead of delivering the promised integration recent years have actually intensified the fragmentation of enforcement efforts, a problem raised as a serious weakness by the CJI only a year earlier 102 and acknowledged by the DOE. 103 In 2011, the CJI published a follow-up to its 2007 report, which expressed concern about the pronounced narrowing of waste enforcement effort that had resulted from the creation of the ECU. 104 While it acknowledged the Unit's improved investigative approach to serious waste crime, the CJI also expressed concern that the concentration on using resource-intensive confiscation of assets powers as the primary approach to sanctioning meant it could only handle 16 live cases at any one time. 105 The CJI also raised important concerns about the negative collateral impacts of this strategy on the rest of the agency's enforcement capacity, particularly on enforcement concerning the regulated waste industry. The report highlighted not only that most of the LRMU's enforcement staff had been transferred to the new ECU, 106 but also that this diminution of enforcement capacity has forced what remained of the LRMU to rely excessively on a compliance-based approach to regulation, characterised by a failure to prosecute even where this was acknowledged to be the most appropriate regulatory response.
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The consequences of this lack of enforcement action came under the public spotlight in a dramatic way with the discovery of the massive illegal Mobuoy dump in 2013, which had been operated 28 behind a facade of legitimacy by a licensed waste management company. More recently, the NIEA have attempted to redress this imbalance through a programme of investment in the LRMU, the creation of an enforcement team within the LRMU, the development of protocols between the ECU and the LRMU and a widening of the ECU's spectrum of activities.
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The falling levels of enforcement action post-2008 coupled with persistent fragmentation of enforcement efforts ultimately led to a scenario where the deterrent effect of enforcement action undertaken by the NIEA in relation to waste has been substantially undermined. In order to create a meaningful deterrent sanctions must be certain in their imposition and severe to the extent that they outweigh the potential benefits that can be derived from non-compliance.
consequences of enforcement action being taken do not outweigh the profits to be made.'
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This has been clearly demonstrated in Northern Ireland, where both the certainty and the severity of enforcement action have been compromised. The narrowing of enforcement activity that has occurred has reduced the likelihood that any sanction will be imposed at all. While this constricted approach to enforcement has led to improvements in how some types of serious waste crime have been handled, the corresponding reduction in enforcement activity levelled at low and mid-range offenders has created a gap in the overall enforcement response. This has been exacerbated by further fragmentation of enforcement efforts and a failure to utilise the expertise in criminal justice enforcement developed within the ECU across the enforcement activities of the agency as a whole. In terms of the severity of sanctions imposed, while the use of confiscation proceedings creates a deterrent for some illegal operators at the serious end of the waste crime spectrum, other enforcement outcomes (notably fines imposed as a result of 'traditional' criminal prosecutions) have been inadequate in terms of outweighing the financial benefits that can be gained from engaging in waste crime. 111 Furthermore, while the increased application for confiscation orders in recent years by the NIEA has most certainly deprived some convicted waste criminals of the benefit of their criminal conduct, in order to create a deterrent the sanction must actually exceed the benefit gained. If this is the case then there is a need for the NIEA and the courts to impose a portfolio of sanctions that not only remove the profit gained from environmental criminal activity, but also deliver a penalty for the criminality in excess of any financial advantage gained. Failure to do so will encourage criminals to take the risks associated with offending as in reality upon conviction they will lose only what they would have gained from their crimes (presuming the fine actually reflects the financial gain made). Ultimately, the net effect of an eroded deterrent has been to send a message to criminals who have the capacity to engage in waste crime for profit that they face a reduced chance of being apprehended, a reduced chance of actually facing any enforcement action and a reduced chance of receiving a sanction that exceeds any profit gained from their illicit activities. commissioned Christopher Mills to review the handling of waste regulation by the NIEA with a particular focus on the extent of the regulatory activity that had occurred in relation to the increasingly embarrassing discoveries in Derry.
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The Mills report was published in December 2013, 117 and although commissioned by the DOE itself rather than an independent scrutiny body its findings can be added to the substantial body of critique levelled at the performance of the DOE in delivering its enforcement function over the past 30 years. However, unlike many of the previous reports which were fairly general in nature, the focus of the Mills report on one particular incident provided a far more detailed insight into the practical consequences of a failure to undertake meaningful enforcement action -especially where the offending transcended regulatory regimes. Many of the report's findings are reminiscent of past criticisms that have clearly remained unaddressed, including the problems derived from a so-called 'silo' approach to working and the consequent lack of 114 See local press reports, (n 2). Environmental Health Regulator. In this capacity the council investigated a number of complaints relating to the site, including noise from traffic on access roads, plant noise, odour, a fire on the site and a fly infestation. Mills reports that these complaints were referred to the NIEA who held primary responsibility for regulation of the waste activities at the site, see Mills (n 117) 14.
proper person' test and exemptions as being in particular need of reform. 125 However an annex to the report also provides a long list of powers available to the NIEA under existing legislation that were either being underused or not used at all. 126 Considering that the need for legislative reform and the lack of appropriate sanctioning tools have been repeatedly cited as reasons for regulatory problems at the agency, and that processes of legislative reform have repeatedly been used as a response to criticisms of regulatory performance in recent years, the fact that considerable powers are available but are reportedly being ignored or underused seems remarkable.
The immediate regulatory response to the public outcry over the failure to undertake enforcement action at the Mobuoy site has resulted in the revocation of a waste management licence and a referral of the file to the PPS with a view to prosecution of a number of individuals connected with the site in question, with the first court hearings beginning in mid-2015. Once an offence has been identified it is important that any sanction imposed exceeds the benefit derived from the criminal activity. This will require the judiciary to take cognisance of sentencing guidelines produced in 2012, 147 the application of a more consistent approach to prosecuting environmental crime by the NIEA in conjunction with the Public Prosecution Service and the NIEA to make full use of the extensive suite of sanctions already at its disposal.
The second problem that has prevented effective enforcement of waste law in Northern
Ireland is that regulatory structures and arrangements for responding to illegal dumping do not appear to be designed in a way that can facilitate a robust response to breaches of waste law.
In addition, the NIEA has appeared resistant to implementing meaningful reform of Ultimately the removal of the NIEA to the new department has not alleviated persistent concerns about the 'captured' nature of the regulator, but rather has reignited calls for an independent environmental protection agency. 155 With local elections due in mid-2016, the planned reorganisation of government departments, 156 the recent illegal dumping discoveries, renewed threats of EU infraction proceedings and overwhelming evidence that radical change is required -the timing for calls for an independent body charged with regulating Northern
Ireland's environment might finally be politically opportune.
In conclusion, issues associated with the border, the involvement of organised criminal networks in illegal dumping and legacy issues related to the structures and delivery of environmental regulation discussed above have all acted as barriers to the effective enforcement of waste law in Northern Ireland. In addition, constant financial pressure and the cutting of the Agency's budgets provide a pressurised context for an already challenging situation. However, the financial problems experienced by the NIEA pale in comparison to the consequences of a failure to deal effectively with illegal waste disposal. With estimates suggesting that the Mobuoy dump alone could cost the Northern Irish tax payer anything up to £100 million to remediate 157 and concerns that a failure to do so could result in infraction fines that could essentially bankrupt the country, 158 the ramifications of historic failures to properly 156 One of the primary reasons why proposals for an independent agency were politically untenable in the past centered around the fact that if the environmental regulator were removed from the DOE, then DOE would essentially become too small to be viable as a government department. This in turn would have forced an already incredibly unstable administration to renegotiate the carving up of key policy areas. For a full discussion of this issue see, Turner and 
